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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to survey what has been done by the New
Economic Geography (NEG) on a regional scale in order to answer the
three following questions: what are the predictions of the NEG concerning
the future of regions in the triad? Are these predictions robust? What can
be the optimal public policy on a regional and national scale in a world
characterized by agglomeration, trade liberalization and entrepreneurs
mobility?
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1 Introduction
« Consider a general equilibrium model in which an arbitrary
number of goods is produced either as inputs or for nal consumption.
The only nonproduced goods are land and labor, each of which is as-
sumed to be homogeneous. Assume that each production function has
constant returns to scale and that all input and output markets are
competitive [...] Under these circumstances, consumers would spread
themselves over the land at a uniform density to avoid bidding up
the price of land above that of land available elsewhere. Adjacent to
each consumer would be all industries necessary directly or indirectly
to satisfy the demands of that customer. Constant returns assures
us that production could take place at an arbitrary small scale with-
out loss of e¢ ciency. In this way, all transportation costs could be
avoided without any need to agglomerate economic activity » Edwin
S. Mills (1967, p198)
In this quote extracted from a section entitled "A World without Cities",
Edwin Mills intuitively describes what is going to be called some years later the
Spatial Impossibility Theorem. This theorem, that we owe to Starrett (1978),
simply says that agglomeration of activities cannot arise in a world of pure and
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perfect competition where space is homogeneous. Thus in order to understand
why activities are agglomerated in some places authors have focused on1 :
1. Localized externalities (Marshall (1890))
2. Heterogeneity of space (von Thünen (1826)), Ricardo (1917), Heckscher
(1918) and Ohlin (1933)
3. Imperfect competition (Hotelling (1929))
More recently, a new approach born with Fujita (1988), Krugman (1991.a)
and Venables (1996), has revisited this problematics of "Who does What, Where
and Why?". That literature which makes the heterogeneity of space endogenous
by integrating pecuniary externalities and imperfect competition starts from the
same observation that activities are unevenly spread in space. As a very crude
approximation, Figure 12 illustrates how that statement is obvious, a signicant
part of the world being agglomerated in huge cities and this agglomeration
increases from year to year3 .
Figure 1 Urban population and rate of urbanization growth
The questions arise by these observations are relative to the conditions of ag-
glomeration: a) what are they?; b) Can these conditions vanish in the future?;
c) What is the place of governments in a world characterized by agglomeration,
trade liberalization and mobility of rms? Here we focus on models that deal
1For a survey of these three determinants see Fujita and Thisse (1996) and Ottaviano and
Thisse (2005)
2Source: Authors calculation based on the World Urbanization Prospects (Department of
Economic and Social A¤airs).
3For instance the rate of urbanization growth in half a century will be around 75% in a
majority of African countries
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exclusively with entrepreneursmobility4 . In order to emphasize the evolution
and progress of the NEG in part due to a recent but intensive dialogue between
empirical and theoretical studies we proceed in four steps: the rst one examines
the main results of the theoretical eld, while the second presents articles which
question these conclusions empirically. The third step emphasizes the theoreti-
cal renements that have been introduced and lastly the fourth part focuses on
public policy and most particularly on welfare, tax competition and investment
in R&D.
2 From dispersion to agglomeration, the initial
theoretical considerations
« The more populous region will o¤er both a greater real wage
and a greater variety of goods. In equilibrium all workers will have
concentrated in one region or the other. Which region ends up with
the population depends on initial condition; in the presence of in-
creasing returns history matters » Krugman (1979, p.478)
This rst part presents models where entrepreneurs are i) immobile between
sectors, mobile geographically ii) mobile between sectors but immobile between
regions iii) mobile between regions and at the source of endogenous growth.
2.1 Regional factor mobility
2.1.1 Consumersbehavior
All individuals in the Krugman (1991.a) model share the constant-elasticity-of-
substitution utility function of Avinash Dixit and Joseph Stiglitz (1977):
U =MA1  with M =
24 NZ
0
c
 1

i di
35

 1
(1)
whereM is the consumption of the manufactures aggregate, A of the agricultural
product, N is the large number of potential varieties and  > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution among these varieties. A share  of nominal income (denoted
Y ) is spent on manufactures. The budget constraint is then given by:
PM + pAA = Y
where pA is the price of the agricultural product and P the price index of
industrial varieties:
P =
24 NZ
0
p1 i di
35
1
1 
(2)
4Models that deal with capital mobility have been widely surveyed in Baldwin et al. (2003).
Since the publication of this monograph no signicant improvements have been made except
one concerning the heterogeneity of rms which is the subject of a large digression.
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which is a decreasing function of the number of varieties N (because 1  < 0).
pi is the price of a typical variety i. The impact of N on the price index depends
on the elasticity of substitution. The more di¤erentiated the product varieties,
the greater the reduction in the price index. The maximization problem yields
the following uncompensated demand for agriculture and manufactures:
M = 
Y
P
; A = (1  ) Y
pa
(3)
ci = 
Y
P 1 
p i (4)
We can now turn to the rmsbehavior.
2.1.2 Firmsbehavior
Concerning the cost function, many types of modelling have been adopted, rstly
Krugman (1991.a) considers in its Core-Periphery model (CP for short) that
there are specic factors: entrepreneurs are the only input necessary to the
production of a typical variety with a technology that involves a xed input
of  and a marginal requirement of . The cost function is thus given by
TCCP = wh + whq. Secondly in their Footloose Entrepreneurs model (FE
for short), Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) consider that the xed cost and the
marginal cost are associated with di¤erent factors: the xed cost involves 
units of entrepreneurs while the variable cost requires  units of workers. Thus
the total cost of producing q units of a typical manufactured variety is TCFE =
wh + waq. To sum up we can write these total costs in a general form such
as:
TC = f + mq (5)
with (f;m) = (wh; wh) in the CP, (f;m) = (wh; wa) in the FE.
Because each rm produces a distinct variety, the number of rms is also the
number of varieties consumed. Thus each rm is a monopolist on the production
of its variety, and faces the demand function (4). But a key feature of the Dixit-
Stiglitz monopolistic competition is that rms ignore the e¤ects of their action
on income Y , and on the price index P . Hence the demand curve as perceived by
a typical rm is not (4), but rather q = bp  where b = Y=P 1  is considered
as a constant by each rm. According to this behavior, when maximizing its
prot, a typical rm sets the following price:
p = m=(   1) (6)
Because there is free entry, prots are always equal to zero, which, using equa-
tions (5) and (6), gives the output level:
q = f(   1)=m (7)
In equilibrium in the CP model a typical rm employs f +mq entrepreneurs,
so that the total demand is n(f + mq), which according to (7) is equal to
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n. As entrepreneurslabour supply is given by S, the equalization provides
the following number of varieties: nCP = S . In the FE a typical rm employs
 units of entrepreneurs, so that the total demand is n. As entrepreneurs
labour supply is also S, the equalization gives the following number of varieties:
nFE =
S
 . In summary:
n =
S
"
(8)
with " =  in the CP, " =  in the FE. The number of varieties produced is
then proportional to the number of workers.
2.1.3 Transaction costs
So far, the model has almost been described as a closed economy. The next
step is to relax this assumption. Industrial varieties are exchanged between
regions under transaction costs which take the form of iceberg costs: if an
industrial variety produced in the Northern market is sold at price p there, then
the delivered price (c.i.f) of that variety in the South is going to be p. The
assumption of iceberg costs implies that rms charge the same producer price
in both regions. The rst-order conditions for a typical rms sales on its local
market and on its export market are p = m=(  1) and p = m=(  1),
but in all models authors assumed that  = (   1)=, which gives
p = m; p = m
This normalization and the fact that wages in the agricultural sector are taken
as the numeraire and normalized to one, simplify prices, which only depend on
entrepreneurswages in the CP and which are equal to one in the FE. Further-
more the entrepreneurstotal number is also normalized to one: S + S = 1.
Then, iceberg transaction costs imply a modication of the price index.
Using the above normalization the authors nd:
P 1  =
Sm1  + Sm1 
"
; (P )1  =
Sm1  + Sm1 
"
(9)
where  measures the free-ness of trade :  = ()1 . This degree of trade
increases from  = 0 with innite trade costs, to  = 1, with zero trade costs.
Ceteris paribus, at the symmetric equilibrium (S = 1=2), an increase in S (and
so a decrease in S) implies, as long as there are transaction costs ( < 1), an
increase in price index in the South and a decrease in price index in the North.
We now need to integrate transaction costs into the demand function. By
inserting the above prices (6) in the demand function (4), and by considering
the total demand as the sum of local demand and export demand, we get:
q = (
Y
P 1 
p  + 
Y 
P 1 
p ) (10)
Considering this expression, we have just seen that an increase in the population
in the North, increases P 1  and decreases P 1 , and thus fosters a decrease
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in the total demand q in the North (if  < 1). Turning to the e¤ect of a change
of income location requires the following equations:
Y = Swh + Lwa (11)
Y  = Swh + L
wa (12)
An increase in the entrepreneurial force, S, in the North, and thus a decrease
in the South, S, increases expenditure in this country and lowers it abroad,
which causes, as long as there are impediments to trade ( < 1), an increase in
demand q.
These equations permit us to present the market clearing in a tidy form by
equalizing the demand (10) to the supply which is given by equation (7) :
fm 1 = b(
Y
P 1 
+ 
Y 
P 1 
) (13)
with b =  . The most signicant di¤erence between the FE and CP models
is that in the CP model, nominal wages cannot be obtained analytically since
m, Y , P , f and m depend on wh while in the FE only f and Y depend on wh
and thus the analytical expression of nominal wages is rather straightforward.
The detailed description of the FE is postponed to the section concerning public
policy; indeed the tractability of this model is going to be an advantage in this
section. For the moment we focus on the CP model which is one of the main
tool of section 4. Indeed in this section we are going to consider models which
drop agricultural workers, and in such a context the FE total cost function is
no longer useful and the interest of the CP model is restored.
2.1.4 Market clearing condition and the long run in the CP
In the CP model, f = m = wh, which gives the following market clearing thanks
to (13):
wh = b(
Y
P 1 
+ 
Y 
P 1 
)
As we have just noticed, nominal wages cannot be obtained analytically,
however it is possible to investigate the relationships between price indices
and wages by linearizing the model around the symmetric equilibrium (when
S = S = 1=2). Indeed, at the symmetric equilibrium, a modication of one
variable in one region is associated with an equal modication of the corre-
sponding variable in the other region, but with an opposite sign, so by letting
dwh
wh
=  dwhwh = cwh and so on, we get the following expression by way of a log
di¤erentiation of price indices and wages:
bP = 1
1  Z[
bS + (1  )cwh] (14)
cwh = Z(bY + (   1) bP ) (15)
with Z =
1  
1 + 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where Z can be considered as a reversed measure of trade openness: there is
autarky when Z = 1, and free trade for Z = 0.
Concerning the rst expression (14), and since entrepreneurssupply of labor
is perfectly elastic, cwh = 0, an increase in the number of entrepreneurs in the
North, bS, implies a decrease in the price index in this country. This e¤ect is
known as the local competition e¤ect (Fujita al. (1999)) or as the market
crowding e¤ect (Baldwin et al. (2003)) Concerning the second expression
(15), we can eliminate bP by using (14); we then divide the two sides of this
equation by bY , which gives:
bSbY = 1Z   ( Z2 + 1  )cwhbY (16)
thus by considering once again that entrepreneurs labour supply is perfectly
elastic, cwh = 0 we get the famous home market e¤ect (Krugman (1980)),
also known as the market access-e¤ect (Baldwin et al. (2003)):
bSbY = 1Z
then one percent change in the northern demand for manufactures, bY , increases
entrepreneursemployment, bS, by 1Z (> 1) percent in the North. This e¤ect
capture the idea that increasing returns activities tend to concentrate their
production near the largest market and export to the smallest. When trade is
liberalized (Z tends to zero) this e¤ect increases, this can be understood as the
fact that the large market serves as a base for exports, and thus when the cost of
exporting decreases, the interest of being agglomerated increases. We are going
to discuss the pervasiveness of this HME in the next section. Furthermore we
can observe that an increase of S increases Y , (see the equation of income (11)).
Then the larger manufacturing sector has a larger home market, and since we
have just seen that the larger home market has a more than proportionally larger
manufacturing sector, these equations provide what Krugman (1991.a) called
the backward linkage in honor of Hirschman (1958), which is considered as a
cryptic monikerby Baldwin et al. (2003) who qualify this mechanism as the
demand-linked circular causality.
To sum up, two opposite forces drive these relative nominal wages, on the
one hand an increase in the number of entrepreneurs in one region exacerbates
local competition among rms, thus new entry triggers a slump in the price
index, and thereby in operating prots, too, so that in order to stay in the
market rms need to remunerate their workers less (local competition e¤ect).
But on the other hand as the income generated by the new entrepreneur is
spent locally, sales and operating prots increase and under the zero prot
conditionthis implies a higher nominal wage (market access e¤ect). However
entrepreneurs do not consider the relative nominal wage when they decide to
migrate but the relative real wage. Hence in the long run migration stops when
real wages are equalized in case of symmetry (S = 12 ), or when agglomeration in
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one city generates a higher relative real wage. Thus by denoting 
 this relative
real wage, and by dening it by:

 =
V
V 
=
wh
wh
(
P 
P
)  (17)
where V is the locations total real income in the North, we will have a stable
total agglomeration in the North if 
 > 1, and a stable dispersed equilibrium if
d
jS=1=2
dS < 0.
Let us notice that in the long run (17) one additional force appears: the
term P =P which is the cost of living e¤ect, is known as an agglomerative
force. Indeed, we already know that goods are cheaper in a central place be-
cause imports are lower and thus the burden of transaction costs too. Hence,
entrepreneurspurchasing power is higher in this location which attracts other
entrepreneurs. This is the cost-linked circular causality also called forward
linkage.
2.1.5 The tomahawk diagram
ln order to see how the size of regions globally changes with trade liberalization,
the literature uses numerical simulations and obtains the Figure 2, called the
tomahawk diagram.
50
100
North’s share of the world
endowment of entrepreneurs (in %)
Trade
Freeness
( )fb
fsf
0
Figure 2 The tomahawk diagram
In Figure 2, the vertical axis measures the norths share of the world endowment
of entrepreneurs, while the horizontal axis plots the trade liberalization level.
From Figure 2 two important results can be drawn:
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Proposition 1 Trade liberalization leads to agglomeration
Indeed before a critical point of trade liberalization5 s, the negative e¤ects
of high transaction costs are too strong to be overtaken by the positive e¤ects of
agglomeration, and thus the two regions remain identical. But after this point,
agglomeration can occur catastrophically in one of the two regions.
Proposition 2 Depending on the trade liberalization level, two or three di¤er-
ent location congurations are stable equilibria
Indeed, after a critical point of trade liberalization s, and before the crit-
ical point6 b, dispersion of activities in the two regions, or agglomeration in
the South, or agglomeration in the North are all stable equilibria7 . After b
agglomeration in the North is equivalent to agglomeration in the South.
These two propositions are strong and deserve to be compared to other
modelling.
2.2 Sectorial factor mobility
If entrepreneursmobility is a central determinant of agglomeration on a re-
gional scale, one can wonder what will happen if this mobility is restricted by
immigration law or by cultural divergence. This question has been undertaken
by Krugman and Venables (1995) in a model called the Core Periphery Verti-
cal Linkages (CPVL for short). In this model, agglomeration or more exactly
specialization is driven by the interest of rms that produce and use interme-
diate goods. Indeed in a big market these rms nd bigger outlets (backward
linkage) but also intermediate inputs at a lower price (forward linkage). This
model has been simplied by Ottaviano (2002), actually known as the Foot-
loose Entrepreneurs Vertical Linkages (FEVL for short) and a unied version,
which we propose to survey here, has been proposed by Ottaviano and Robert-
Nicoud (2006). In this last version the authors consider the xed cost as a
Cobb-Douglas function of workers and manufacturing goods which are used
respectively in the proportion 1    and , while the variable cost is also a
Cobb-Douglas function of workers and manufacturing goods but where these
two inputs are used in the proportion 1   and ; in such a case the total cost
is given by TC = w1 a P
 + w1 a P
q and as before we can write this total
cost in such a general form as:
TC = f + mq (18)
with (f;m) = (w1 a P
; w1 a P
). The CPVL is found by assuming that the
share of workers used as a xed cost and as a variable cost is the same:  = ,
while in the FEVL, the authors assume that rms only use agricultural workers
5s is given implicitly by 1 = 
a
s (s
1+
2
+ 1 
2s
) with a = =(   1)
6This critical point is equal to b =
1 a
1+a
1 
1+
7Stable equilibria are represented by a solid line, as opposed to dashed lines which represent
unstable equilibria
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as a variable cost:  6=  = 0. Agricultural wages are taken as the numéraire
and normalized to one. Then in the CPVL we get (f;m) = (P  ; P ), while in
the FEVL we have (f;m) = (P; 1). The pure prot of the rm, , is thus
composed of operating prot minus the xed cost:
 =    f with  = pq   mq (19)
By maximizing this pure prot a typical rm sets the following price:
p = m=(   1) (20)
By assuming that  =  1 and by inserting this price in operating prot (19)
we get:
q =

m
(21)
By using (20) and iceberg costs into price index yields:
P 1  = nm1  + nm1 ; (P )1  = nm1  + nm1 
This implies that in the CPVL price indices are dened in a recursive way since
m = P  , while in the FEVL this is not the case because m = 1.
Turning to sales two kinds of agent need to be considered: on the one hand
workers and entrepreneurs consume manufactured goods as nal goods, their
demand is denoted d1 and on the other hand rms use these goods as interme-
diate inputs; their input demand is denoted d2. Then the total demand in the
North is c = d1 + nd2 + (d1 + nd

2) where d1 and d2 are found by applying
respectively the Roy identity to the indirect utility, and the Shephard lemma
to the total cost function. The market clearing condition is given by equalizing
(21) to the total demand c, which gives:
 = mb

E
P 1 
+ 
E
P 1 

with b =


with E the total expenditure in the North:
E = L+ n(1 + (   1)

)
The expression of this short run is very close to that displayed by the classic
CP model: indeed two opposite forces drive this operating prot, on the one
hand an increase in the number of rms in the industrial sector exacerbates
local competition between them, thus new entry triggers a slump in the price
index, and thereby in operating prots, too. But on the other hand as the
revenue generated by the new rm is spent on intermediate inputs, sales and
operating prots increase more than proportionally in the presence of iceberg
costs (market access e¤ect). However rms do not consider the operating prot
when they decide about entry or exit but the pure prot. Hence in the long run,
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there is neither entry nor exit when pure prot is equal to zero or by equivalence
when q = f is equal to the unity. Firmscreation or destruction stop in the
North and in the South when respectively

n = 0 and

n

= 0, where

n and

n

are dened by:

n = n(q   1); n = n(q   1)
with q =

f
In the two models f is a price index function, then a new agglomeration force
occurs in the long run. In the CP/FE model this force was called the cost of
living e¤ect, here it is better to call it the production-cost-linked agglomera-
tion (Baldwin et al. (2003)). Indeed we already know that goods are cheaper
in a central place because imports are lower and thus the burden of transac-
tion costs, too, hence, the protability of rms is higher in this location which
attracts further entry. As in the CP/FE model, in these two vertical linkage
models, the dispersive force, which is strongest when trade is restricted, erodes
faster than agglomeration forces with respect to , then the dispersive equi-
librium where the two countries produce manufacturing goods turns into an
agglomerative one where only the North or the South produces these items.
But the similarity between the two classes of model does not stop here: indeed,
the congurations of equilibrium are exactly the same as those described by the
Tomahawk diagram (See Figure 2), even the break point and sustain point are
identical8 . Then Proposition 1 and 2 seem to be strong results, and we may
wonder if the introduction of forward-looking behavior9 and endogenous growth
à la Grossman-Helpman-Romer could change these results.
2.3 Regional growth
Based on capital mobility, Martin and Ottaviano (1999) and Baldwin et al.
(2001) introduce endogenous growth in the NEG framework. This introduction
8This result is surprising since these models are quite di¤erent, in fact these models are
all "isomorphic" as has been demonstrated by Robert-Nicoud (2005): "[these models] can
entirely characterized by the same set of equations in the appropriate state-cum-parameter
space"
9Concerning forward-looking behavior, Krugman (1991b) is the rst one to emphasize the
importance of expectations versus history, however its model is a pre-economic geographical
model. Indeed in the place of pecuniary externalities, technological externalities are used as
a central force of agglomeration. Ottaviano (1999) and Ottaviano et al. (2002) go one step
beyond by linking pecuniary externalities and forward-looking behavior in the linear version
of the C-P model while Baldwin (2001) argues that the richness of the C-P model (overlap
between break point and sustain point) is a good basis to investigate through numerical sim-
ulations the role of expectations in the decision of location. Between these two approaches,
Ottaviano (1999) proposed a model which is closed to the FE that we have studied so far, and
which mimics C-Ps results. From these papers an important conclusion emerges: forward-
looking expectations are equivalent to myopic behavior in case of high migration costs, impa-
tience of workers, and weak agglomeration forces; in the opposite case, a specic (agglomerate
or dispersive) equilibrium could be locally stable (between b and s) but globally instable
owing to the mere shift in expectation.
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has generated a ourishing literature which has been surveyed thoroughly by
Baldwin and Martin (2004). But surprisingly models with entrepreneurial mo-
bility take a small place in this literature, only two models, those of Baldwin
and Forslid (2000) and Fujita and Thisse (2002), focus on this issue. We pro-
pose to survey the latter model, which deals with the FE instead of the CP
and thus appears more tractable. Considering this model, the main di¤erence
with the FE/CP model comes from the introduction of an R&D sector where
entrepreneurs produce a patent which represents industrial rmsxed costs.
The presence of this new sector thus generates spillovers for the industrial sec-
tor by increasing its productivity level. In this paper, the authors conrm the
conclusion of the Footloose Capital model with endogenous growth: geography
and growth are linked, an increase in the growth rate fosters agglomeration and
agglomeration improves the growth rate. This R&D sector produces patents
under perfect competition and the number of patents produced depends on the
capital of past ideas K and on the number of entrepreneurs, S. Thus in the
North the number of patents produced is:
n = KS (22)
where K is determined in an endogenous way by entrepreneursspatial distribu-
tion, or more precisely by the spatial distribution of personal knowledge k(j) and
by the entrepreneursinteraction intensity. The authors proposed the following
form K =
hR Sr
0
k(j)dj + 
R 1 Sr
0
k(j)dj
i1=
where  expresses entrepreneurs
complementarity in the creation of knowledge and  the nature of spillovers.
When  = 1 spillovers are global, and on the opposite when  = 0 spillovers are
local. Moreover, the personal knowledge of an individual j, k(j), is assumed to
be a positive function of the patent stock nw(= n+n) such as k(j) = nw, the
authors normalize  to one and by inserting k(j) into the equation of K they
nd : K = N [S + (1  S)]1= . But instead of using [S + (1  S)]1= Fujita
and Thisse use a more general form denoted (S; ; ) which is assumed to be
a convex and increasing function of S with (0; ; ) = 0, (1; ; ) = 1 and
(S; 0; ) = 1: They thus get:
K = nw(S; ; ) (23)
The lifetime of patents is supposed to be innite, the monopoly power of a rm
is thus also eternal, so that the variation of the stock of patents in the economy
over the time is given by

nw = n+ n and so by using (22) and (23) yields:

nw = nwg(S) (24)
where g(S) is the growth rate of variety which depends on entrepreneursspatial
distribution:
g(S) = S(S; ; ) + S(S; ; )
This expression calls for an important remark : the growth rate follows a U-
shape with respect to the number of entrepreneurs. This means that agglom-
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eration leads to a higher growth than dispersion10 . Furthermore whatever en-
trepreneursspatial distribution, any policies that make local spillovers global
(increase in ) raise the growth rate. These remarks are going to be useful in
section 5. Each rm in the R&D sector take as given the capital of past ideas, K,
and then considers entrepreneursmarginal productivity as equal to K. With
the equilibrium northern entrepreneurswages, given by the average productiv-
ity in this region, equation (22) implies that the unit costs of a new patent is
equal to whnw(S;;) and since there is free entry, the zero-prot condition implies
that this unit cost equalizes wages, which gives:
wh = n
w(S; ; ) (25)
Since there is free entry in the industrial sector, the price of the patent  equals
the asset value of rms that start their production by buying a patent. In
order to calculate this asset value, the authors need to specify the nature of
spillovers, then they divide their analysis into two steps: rstly, they consider
that spillovers are global and then they consider the opposite point of view. In
the former analysis, they conclude that the R&D sector is always agglomerated
in one country, for instance in the North, while the industrial sector moves from
a partial agglomeration in the North to a total agglomeration in this country
when trade is liberalized; dispersion is then never sustainable, contrary to the
latter case of local spillovers where the process of agglomeration leads the two
sectors from dispersion to agglomeration. We consider this last assumption of
local spillovers as central and thus we decide to focus on it (we write (S)
instead of (S; ; )). With the help of (22) the number of rms at time t is
given by

nw = n0Se
g(S)t where n0 is the initial number of varieties, by solving
the di¤erential and by assuming that the growth rate is constant in time, the
authors nd that the number of variety in the North is given by:
n = nw (26)
where  represents the share of the North contribution to the growth of the total
number of varieties:  = (S)Sg(S) . By inserting this number of varieties (26), with
p = 111 into price index dened by (2) yields:
P 1  = ( + )nw (27)
The equilibrium operating prot in the North is given by  = pq   mq, and
then equal to12  = q=. All this allows the authors to obtain the asset value
of an industrial rm: (t) =
R1
t
e ( t)()d , and this asset value gives the
10 Indeed g(S) is symmetric around 1=2 and when S = 0 and S = 1 we get g(0) = g(1) = 1,
and g0 Q 0 when S Q 1
2
. And an increase in  raises the growth rate g(S) which attains its
maximal value at  = 1, in this last case g(S) = 1.
11Remember that in the FE we have considered  = (  1)=, m = wa = 1; then by eq.(6)
we obtain p = 1.
12Where the equilibrium output q is available from the FE model (in (10))
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nominal wage since wh(t) = (t)nw(S)=. Thus wh(t) is given by:
wh(t) =


(S)
 + g(S)

E
 + 
+
E
 + 

(28)
where  is the subjective discount rate of consumers. In this model this sub-
jective discount rate is equal to the equilibrium interest rate13 . Considering
equation (28), expenditure E now is given by:
E = L+ S[+W (0)] (29)
with  =


Ew
 + g(S)
where  is the entrepreneur initial endowment, and W (0) is the present value
of wages given by W (0) =
R1
0
e r(t)twh(t)dt where r(t) is the average interest
rate: one unit of income at the time t is converted to
R1
0
e r(t)twh(t)dt unit at
the time 0. With r(t) =  and wh(t) given by (28) we get W (0). Lastly the
ratio of indirect utility is given by:

 =
c+ wh
c+ wh
(
P
P 
) 
The necessary condition in order to prove that agglomeration in the North is a
stable steady state growth path (ss-growth path for short) is given by 
 > 1,
while 
 = 1 needs to be veried when S 2 (0; 1). However this condition is
not su¢ cient here: indeed, the North can have a higher nominal wage while the
South can have a lower price index (and vice versa) and then entrepreneurs can
increase their intertemporal utility by changing their location during their life
cycle. As the authors remark, entrepreneurs convexify their location choices"
since their forward looking behavior and their mobility allows them to average
their consumption in their lifetime. As a result, the authors show that in the
interval [s; b] for a given and constant number of entrepreneurs in one region,
cross-migration can occur. Concerning the Tomahawk diagram, Figure 3 illus-
trates what happens when trade is liberalized in unexpectedly14 . For high trade
costs, the dispersive ss-growth path is stable but after s the symmetric equi-
librium becomes a quasi ss-growth path, and lastly after b the agglomerative
ss-growth path is the only stable one.
13 Indeed the Euler condition gives

Ew(t)
Ew(t)
= r(t)   where Ew(t) represents the worldwide
expenditure, and according to the equilibrium output (10) workers total demand in the in-
dustrial sector is equal to Ew: Moreover in the agricultural sector workersdemand is equal
to (1 )Ew, then with Lw the total workersdemand we get Lw = (1 )Ew+Ew, which
gives Ew = Lw and since Lw is constant in time, we obtain

Ew(t)
Ew(t)
= 0 = r(t)    and thus
r(t) = .
14Since entrepreneurs are forward looking the description of the Tomawak diagram needs to
be made carefully. We can consider that trade policy changes unexpectedly or as the authors
argue "another way may be to assume that the transport parameter changes very slowly in
comparison with the actual working of market processes, and hence the actual conguration
of the economy at each time can be approximated by that of the ss-growth or quasi ss-growth
equilibrium under the corresponding value of trade costs".
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Figure 3 The tomahawk diagram
Once again we can remark that proposition 1 and 2 still hold: indeed trade
liberalization leads to agglomeration (Proposition 1) and even if between the
break and sustain point the dispersive equilibrium is not a stable equilibrium
as in the FE/CP/VL models, two opposite congurations of location remain
stable (Proposition 2). These results are strong and then deserve empirical
verications.
3 The empirical observations
3.1 Questioning Proposition 1
3.1.1 The Japanese case
In order to analyze how the location of the Japanese population has changed over
the past 8,000 years, Davis and Weinstein (2002) calculate di¤erent measures
of the Variation in Regional Density (VRD for short). Regarding this VRD,
three central points are remarkable: at rst in the early stages of economic
development (from -6000 to 300) the VRD is relatively high, in such a case the
rst nature (climate, endowment of resources) explains the agglomeration of the
population; secondly from 1721 through 1872, all indicators decrease and this
period of dispersion seems to correspond to a period of closure to trade in Japan.
Lastly the schift to free trade and the start of the Japans industrial revolution
around the year 1872 is marked by a rise in the VRD which reveals an increase
in the concentration of activities. These intuitions are conrmed by Fujita et
al. (2004) who point out that from 1920 to 2000, the populations share of the
periphery (non-metropolitan areas) decreases from 36.4% to 17.9% while the
share of Tokyo increases from 11.8% to 25.1%. However these observations are
insu¢ cient, the close study of the net migration of the three largest metropolitan
areas (Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya) and of Theils measure of the interregional per
capita real income di¤erential allow Fujita et al. (2004) to reach interesting
conclusions.
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Figure 4 Net migration and the Theils measure (Source: Fujita et al.
(2004))
From Figure 4 three cycles of urbanization can be dened. ln the rst one,
within the years 1955-1975, the authors consider that the intuitions of the CP
model are perfectly veried between 1955 and 1962. Indeed, this period is
characterized by an increase in the share of manufacturing industries such as
electrical industries or material industries, which have strong increasing returns
and technological linkage, but also by a decrease in primary activities and in
the internal costs of transportation. However on account of increasing wages
and in land prices in these metropolitan areas, the growth rate of net migration
clearly decreases around the year 1965. Land rent is thus a central variable
that is lacking in the CP model and that we are going to consider in the next
section. During the second cycle (1975-1985), the globalization of the world
economy and the appreciation of the yen increase competition between Japan,
the USA and the newly industrialized countries of East Asia. This exacerbation
of competition has led to signicant structural change in the Japanese economy.
Indeed workers in the periphery, specialized in traditional commodities produc-
tion, have endured a decrease in their real wages while on the other hand the
only one city which enjoyed at the time an international airport and a major
concentration of human capital i.e. Tokyo has been able to undertake a special-
ization in knowledge-intensive activities such as the R&D of high-tech products.
Finally the decrease of net migration during the period 1985-95 is in part due
to the recession that started in 1990 after the breakdown of the land markets
bubbles15 .
3.1.2 The USA case
At global level Kim (1995) is one of the rst authors to analyze the distrib-
ution of economic activities in the USA on long series, his study over the period
1860-1987 reveals that the regional specialization in manufacturing has rst in-
creased until 1947 and next declined by 32.2 %16 . By using the Gini location
15Concerning the third cycle, Fujita et al. (2004) propose to "interpret it as the sinking
ship syndrome; people desperately climb to the top of the ship while it is slowly sinking"
16This result is obtain at the three-digit level, at the two-digit level the decreasing rate is
around 47 % over the period. This indicates a bias in the aggregation.
16
coe¢ cient, based on the Hoover Location Quotient (LQ for short)17 , this au-
thor moreover shows that this specialization and de-specialization seems to be
followed by a phenomenon of concentration (between 1860-1927) and dispersion
of activities (between 1947-1987). More recently, Holmes and Stevens (2004)
conrm this point of view: indeed by calculating the same location quotient for
the years 1947 and 1999, they observe that "the term manufacturing belt is no
longer appropriate for this area" since the LQ has strongly decreased over the
period. On the contrary, the LQ of the residual region has risen from 0.45 to 0.9,
which may indicate that a phenomenon of dispersion grows in some places in the
US. By analyzing the e¤ects of the NAFTA on American border states, Hanson
(2001) found clear evidence of a positive impact on employment in American
border states. For him this indicates "that the manufacturing activities that
are expanding in U.S. border cities are activities that previously took place in
interior U.S. sites, NAFTA is likely to have a larger than anticipated impact
on industry location". By focusing on US counties, Hanson (2005) performs
a structural test of a competitive model of Krugmans (1991.a), the Helpman
(1998) model which displays a dispersion of activities when trade is liberalized
(this model is going to be discussed in the next section), and nds that the
parameters estimated verify the theoretical hypothesis.
At city level This phenomenon of dispersion is perhaps more evident on
an urban scale: Glaeser and Kahn (2004) show that the spreading out of the
metropolitan area, commonly known as sprawl18 , is an important feature of
the American landscape. For these authors the main explanation of such an
evolution is based on the automobile: before this mode of transport big cities
17Hoovers location quotient is dened by:
LQij =
Eij
Eius
=
Ej
Eus
where Eij is employment in the industry i for region j, Ej is total employment in region j,
Eius is total employment in industry i, Eus is total employment in the USA. Then the Lorenz
curve of location disparities is obtained i) by calculating the LQ of one industry i for all regions
j ii) by ranking the regions according to their LQs in descending order iii) by calculating the
cumulative percentage of employment in industry i over the regions iv) by calculating the
cumulative percentage of employment in total manufacturing over the region. If industry i
is perfectly dispersed over space, then the location quotient is equal to one, and the location
curve follows a 45-degree line, on the contrary if industry i is agglomerated in some regions,
then the location curve becomes concave. The Gini coe¢ cient is dened as the area between
the 45-degree line and the location curve divided by the triangular area. This Gini coe¢ cient
has many drawbacks, and needs to be considered carefully, Ellison and Glaeser (1997) and
Maurel and Sédillot (1999) highlighted the problem of such classical indices and proposed a
better coe¢ cient based on a "dartboard approach" (see Combes et al. 2006 for a survey of
these coe¢ cients).
18The concept of sprawl can be considered under two distinct forms, the rst one links
high job decentralization with high population density. A metropolitan area can be composed
of several employment subcenters where each subcenter is dense, the second one, the most
common, considers that high decentralisation is linked with low density. In other words
subcenters have a lower density than the initial center. Glaeser and Kahn (2004) show that
this second version of sprawl tends to dominate.
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were located around ports and railroad hubs19 , but the introduction of cars has
eliminated or decreased the interest of being agglomerated in the core of these
urban giants. With Margo (1992), the authors also concede that rising Amer-
ican incomes have generated a higher demand for land, thus the concomitance
of a mode of transport that reduces distance and the ability to obtain a larger
lot land size tends to foster a decrease in the density of the agglomeration. The
main question is to know whether this sprawl is caused by e¢ cient market or
by distortions. For instance, the lack of marginal cost pricing in transportation
can distort the price of road travel, then the use of the automobile becomes ar-
ticially too cheap, which can generate excessive urban sprawl (Walter (1961)).
Thus, ghting against urban sprawl can be a good policy in this case. In an
important work, Burcheld et al. (2005) also analyze the causes of urban sprawl
by using satellite photography data and through this "portrait from space" they
observe that urbanized land has increased from 1.30% to 1.92% over the period
1976-1992, which can appear relatively small, however as has been emphasized
by Anas and Rhee (2003), the annual growth rate which is equal to 2.48% rep-
resents 2.5 times the annualized growth rate of the population. Thus what are
the causes of this urban sprawl? Burcheld et al. (2005) identify a large panel
of causes which are i) the specialization of cities in sectors where jobs are not
located near the city center ii) the provision of infrastructures that are appro-
priate for cars than for public transports iii) the slow population growth and
the uncertainty about the future of this growth iv) geographical elements that
are in favour of urban sprawl, such as no mountains or rugged land in the fringe,
but also a temperate climate (considering the last factor, and in order to get two
indices of extreme climate, the authors use the cooling degree days, which reect
the demand for air conditioning, and the heating degree days, which represent
the demand for fuel. They show that their sprawl index can be reduced by re-
spectively 6.512 and 4.986 points by a one standard deviation increase in mean
cooling days and heating days) v) the availability of ground water (this factor
is important since it reects the indivisible public facilities that are present in
the agglomeration. For instance, the authors report that in San Antonio, the
Water System charges developers of the periphery fees that can attain $24,000.
In common language these areas are on a "bad line", which means that they
are far from all connection points, then the presence of ground water availabil-
ity can permit to reduce costs by sinking and thus avoid the connection to the
public supply. As a result they nd that the sprawl index increases by 1.222
points with water ground availability) vi) the presence of land beyond municipal
boundaries favours sprawl since it allows the developer to deviate from the citys
regulation20 .
19A look on the map presented in the introduction can indeed illustrate that a majority of
huge cities such as New York, Sao Paulo, or Lagos are ports, while others such as Paris, or
Moscow are well-known to be the hubs of all transportation infrastructures.
20Concerning the causes of agglomeration Kim (1997) pursues his study of concentration and
specialisation in citiesdata, and demonstrates that a citys manufacturing structure reects
that of the region to which it belongs. For this author this fact indicates that concentration is
ruled by regional comparative advantage rather than by increasing returns or scale economies.
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3.1.3 The EU case
At global level Forslid et al. (2002) are the rst to simulate a NEG model
at a very global level. Their model based on Haaland and Norman (1992)
considers three kinds of factors: physical capital, human capital (entrepreneurs)
and labour, which are mobile between the 14 sectors taken into account but not
between the 10 regions chosen. Among the 14 sectors, energy and agriculture are
in pure and perfect competition and use sector-specic natural resources which
lead to decreasing returns to scale with respect to the three production factors in
this sector. The ten other sectors are increasing-returns-to-scale activities which
evolve under monopolistic competition. The authors analyze the impact of trade
liberalization on four of the ten regions, which are northern Europe (Finland,
Iceland, Norway, Sweden), the southern EU (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain), the
western EU (Benelux, Ireland, France, the UK) and the central EU (Austria,
Denmark, Germany, Switzerland). The most signicant change in the location
of production, concerns textile, leather products, and food stu¤s. For those
three sectors, comparative advantages seem to be the reason for agglomeration.
Indeed, textile and leather industries move toward the South which has a labour
comparative advantage, while food industries which have become more and more
intensive in capital, have left the southern EU for the North and the West.
Concerning the most important increasing-returns-to-scale activities which are
metals, chemicals, transport equipments and machinery, they all seem to follow
a non-monotonous relationship between trade liberalization and agglomeration.
The last result is conrmed by the calculation of a concentration index which is
very clearly bell-shaped with respect to trade openness. The main criticism that
can be levelled at this model lies in the fact that parameters used in simulations
are not estimated but chosen in an ad-hoc way which is why these results should
be considered with great care.
At the national level
« Modelling the desirability of variety has been thought to be
di¢ cult, and several indirect approaches have been adopted. The
Hotelling spatial model, Lancasters product characteristics approach,
and the mean-variance portfolio selection model have all been put to
use. These lead to results involving transport costs or correlations
among commodities or securities, and are hard to interpret in gen-
eral terms. We therefore take a direct route » Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977, p297)
« A universal adoption of the assumption of monopoly must have
very destructive consequences for economic theory » John Hicks
(1939, p. 83)21
The importance of natural comparative advantage is also emphasized by Ellison and Glaeser
(1999), who estimate that this advantage can account for 50% of the geographic concentration
of activities
21Quoted by Neary (2000, p.3)
19
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) emphasize that they will propose a direct route
to model diversity; now this direct route is the most travelled, but the Dixit-
Stiglitz monopolistic competition has some drawbacks: rms have a myopic
behaviour when they neglect the impact of their individual decisions on the
industrys price indices. Neither do they take into account the impact of their
own pricing behaviour on income (whats dAspremont et al. (1996) called the
"Ford e¤ect"). Already pointed out by Bain (1967), and conrmed by Head
and Mayer (2004) for who « oligopolistic markets seem empirically more im-
portant than those that combine atomism with product di¤erentiation » , this
lack of interaction among rms does not appear totally satisfying. According
to this, Combess work (1997) is of interest since it conciliates economic geogra-
phy with strategic behaviour among rms in an oligopolistic model. Moreover
his goal to integrate interaction leads this author far away from the modelling
presented before, indeed the preference for diversity is given up and workers
are not mobile ; unemployment is assumed and the equilibrium after a shock is
restored by an adjustment of the quantity of workers employed in each market
(wages are rigid). Then agglomeration implies stronger competition since the
goods produced are homogeneous, but also implies an increase in employment
and then a higher demand. In such a setting the author shows that in the long
run, the conclusion of the CP model holds, agglomeration occurs endogenously
when increasing returns are high and when trade is liberalized. Combes and
Lafourcade (2001) enrich this model by integrating vertical linkages in rms,
accordingly the agglomeration incentive becomes even stronger since the need
for intermediate inputs increases demand, and since the Cournot competition
lowers the price of these intermediate inputs and thus production costs. By
extracting from this theoretical framework a specication that is structurally
estimable the authors are able to test their model (which is not rejected) and
next to use the results of these estimations in order to make numerical simula-
tions. This model is assessed in 64 French sectors over the period 1978-1993.
Their simulations indicate the rmsmark up is higher in Paris and in other ag-
glomerated location than in the Periphery. Yet, the level of sales is even higher
in these central places, indeed simulations show that prots decrease monoton-
ically with distance from the French capital. Lastly the authors simulate the
impact of a 30% reduction in transaction costs and show that after such a shock,
prots in Paris but also in Lyon reach a peak. This last result and the variation
after the 30% shock of a concentration indicator22 (calculated at regional and
national level) seem to indicate that the agglomeration process decreases on a
national scale but increases on a regional scale. Moreover a similar analysis has
been undertaken by Teixeira (2002) on Portuguese data, and the author drew
a very similar conclusion. In a complementary way, Crozet (2004) shows that
agglomeration forces are limited in space. In the case of Germany and Italy,
the activities that the Lombardy and Bavarian regions can attract are located
within a radius of approximately 100 to 150 km. Lastly Redding and Sturm
(2005) worked on German citiesdata over the period 1919-2002 and nd that
22Glaeser and Ellison (1997) coe¢ cient
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during the forty years of German division the cumulative di¤erential of growth
between border cities and other West German cities is around 30%. All this may
indicate that the Core-Periphery conclusion of agglomeration when trade costs
decrease is well adapted to the regional scale but perhaps not to the national
scale.
At city level Lastly we can remark that the urban development of some
European capitals seems to follow a reversed U-curve. For instance Brakman et
al. (2005) show that the population of Madrid and Dublin has increased between
respectively 1900-1970, and 1840-1970, but since the seventies these two cities
experienced a decrease in their population to the advantage of their Periphery.
Moreover Marchand (1993) notes that the rst/closer Parisian suburb (called
Petite Couronne) and the second suburb (Grande Couronne) increased to the
detriment of the center over the period 1920-1990.
3.2 Questioning Proposition 2
The previous studies seem to conclude that the agglomeration of activities has
followed a reversed U-curve since the industrial revolution, thus the question
remains as to whether multiple equilibria are theoretical curiosities or if a re-
gion which hosts the agglomeration of activities can become peripheral after a
signicant shock. ln order to test this, Davis and Weinstein (2002) calculated
the Rank Correlation (RC) between the regional density in a given year and
the regional density in 1998. If we plot this RC over the period, we can remark
that the shape of this curve is impressively at. lndeed, in the year 725 this
RC was around 0.70 and attained monotonically 1 in 1998, which means that
after signicant structural changes which have brought the Japanese economy
from the feudal regime to the modern era, the rank of regions has remained
approximately the same. This result suggests that radical change are not so
frequent, agglomeration in one location seems to be a stable equilibrium. More-
over, in order to isolate one temporary shock that can lead to a multiplicity of
equilibria, Davis and Weinstein (2002) analyzed the e¤ects of the U.S. bombing
campaign against Japanese cities. They strictly reject the hypothesis that the
growth of citiessize follows a random path, in other words a temporary shock
does not have a permanent e¤ect, indeed cities recovered their initial population
15 years after the shock23 . David and Weinstein (2004) go beyond this result
by analyzing a more detailed database: they found that cities not only recover
their population but also their specialization. Those results need to be taken
with great care because Japan is a small country where the mountains and the
sea restrict peoples location. However, they are an indication that agglomer-
23This result is conrmed by Dumais et al (2002) on US county data over the period 1972-
1992. An interesting observation made by these authors and conrmed by Barrios et al.(2005)
on Irish and Portuguese data is that although regional agglomeration is stable, rmsmobility
between region is high, a possible explanation is that dead rms are replaced by rms which
come from other regions.
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ation is a stable equilibrium24 . And that is all the more so as Brakman et al.
(2004) nd a similar conclusion concerning the impact of the shock of the allies
bombing on the growth of Germany cities. However by making a distinction
between the Weast and East Germany they show that the e¤ect of the shock
was only temporary in West Germany and had a permanent e¤ect in East Ger-
many. This result suggests that public policies can have a signicant impact
on the existence of multiple equilibria. lndeed the policies of the two govern-
ments were very di¤erent, while the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) wanted
to promote a reconstruction of the country, the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) focused on the creation of new attractive areas like Eisenhüttenstadt
or NeuHoyerswerda. However, the authors do not conrm this suggestion: the
introduction of the Federal Republic of Germany aid to reconstruction into the
assessment tends to show that the FRG policies have hindered the adjustment
process through the return of the pre-war relative city-size. The explanation
of such a result is that the most heavily hit cities were not those which ben-
eted from the most signicant aids. More investigations seem necessary; the
authors do not include the GDRs support in their regression and thus they do
not explain why the shock has been permanent in East Germany.
4 From agglomeration to dispersion, theoretical
renements
Empirical investigations seem to relativize some conclusions of the FE model,
in particular dispersion seems to occur after agglomeration, then we propose
to examine some extensions or criticisms, such as the weakness of the Home
Market E¤ect, the introduction of heterogeneity, and the integration of land
rent and commuting costs.
4.1 The weakness of the home market e¤ect
We have been able to work only with a highly specialized example,
it is probable, however that "home market e¤ects" of the kind we have
illustrated here are actually quite pervasive. Helpman and Krugman
(1985, p. 209)25
As we have seen, the Home Market E¤ect (HME) is one of the pillars of the
NEG, thus an important issue is to check the robustness of this e¤ect. This test
has been initiated by Head et al. (2002) who found that the HME is pervasive
24We can cast doubt about the fact that this study attains its aim to proove that there is no
multiple equilibria for two reasons, at rst the fact that agglomeration is permanent perhaps
only means that the shock was not enough high (in order to verify this, it is perhaps possible
to estimate the shock and then to simulate it), secondly Davis and Weinstein want to know if
agglomeration and dispersion are multiple equilibria after the second war, but in the theorical
model this happen only for a small range of  ( 2 [s; b]) and perhaps the japanese trade
liberalization was not in this interval during the period analysed.
25Quoted by Head, Mayer and Ries (2002)
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in the sense that this e¤ect exists in a model without product di¤erentiation
but with strategic competition between rms (the Brander (1981) model) and
remains veried when iceberg transaction costs and Dixit-Stiglitz preferences
are relaxed (Ottaviano et al. (2002)). However, by using the Markusen and
Venables (1988) model these authors demonstrate that the introduction of the
armington assumption in the increasing returns activities is not innocuous con-
cerning the HME. The reason for such a result is that in a world with no rms
mobility, national product di¤erentiation protect one from competition, but
entrepreneurial mobility increases local competition. Indeed, when an entrepre-
neur migrates from the South to the North his status switches from being an
imperfect competitor to being a perfect competitor for other entrepreneurs in
the North. This tends to decrease wages and thus the incentive of agglomera-
tion.
More recently Head and Mayer (2004) asked several other relevant questions
concerning the home market e¤ect such as:
« How do we construct demand measures in the presence of more
than two countries? Indeed how does one even formulate the home
market e¤ect hypothesis? The ratios and shares of the theoretical
formulations neglect third country e¤ects »
These questions have found an answer in the theoretical paper of Behrens et
al. (2004). The authors extend the Krugman (1980) model to a multicountry
set-up, and demonstrate that the home market e¤ect exists in such a framework
only when countries have a symmetrical bilateral protection. This situation,
which is highly implausible, raises the question of the real existence of the HME.
Until now empirical works, such as those of Davis and Weinstein (1999,2003),
have approximated the HME by an index which is far from the theoretical
framework which leads Behrens et al. (2004) to write that "this regression
coe¢ cient is hard to interpret clearly". In other words, more than 25 years
after its theoretical discovery, the HME only starts being tested seriously (see
Crozet and Trionfetti (2005)). In the following we will survey how the weakness
of the HME in the framework of the NEG changes the conclusions.
4.1.1 Imperfect elasticity of substitution of the labor supply
The HME is easily understandable: because of transport costs it is more prof-
itable to produce in the country o¤ering a larger market, and to export to the
other. Which is harder to explain is the fact that this HME increases with
respect to trade liberalization. Indeed the equation (16) of the HME, reported
below for convenience (30), clearly shows that when the elasticity of the labor
supply is equal to zero ( bwbY = 0) then the HME becomes equal to 1+1  and thus
increases in . This paradoxal result comes from the fact that the dispersive
force of the market crowding e¤ect disappears when trade is liberalized, thus
the di¤erence in the size of the demand becomes more and more signicant in
determining the choice of location as trade gets freer. This e¤ect emphasized
by Baldwin (2000) is known as the magnication e¤ect of globalization.
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This author remarks that this "magnication e¤ect emphasizes the tendency
for a general lowering of natural and manmade barriers to trade to make the
remaining barriers and discrimination more important, not less important".bhbY = 1Z   ( Z2 + 1  ) bwbY (30)
Z =
1  
1 + 
(31)
However this e¤ect is thwarted by a positive elasticity of the labor supply
( bwbY > 0), indeed the equation (30) shows that an increase in trade liberalization
(decrease in Z) makes the impact of the demand (bY ) stronger on nominal wage
( bw) and this tends to reduce the HME. In Figure 5, we follow Head and Mayer
(2004) by plotting the numerical simulations of the equation (30), the horizontal
axis measures , while the vertical axis displays
bhbY i.e the HME. Then we can
verify that the monotonically increasing HME with respect to trade liberaliza-
tion (the magnication e¤ect) only holds when the elasticity of the labor supply
tends to zero. When that elasticity is high (0.04), the HME vanishes.
Figure 5 The Home Market E¤ect
In the CP model this elasticity is equal to zero since it is assumed that labour
is specic to each sector. By introducing arable land into the production of
agricultural goods, and by assuming that entrepreneurs are not mobile between
regions but between sectors, Puga (1999) introduces such an imperfect elasticity
of substitution, which decreases the HME and which exacerbates competition
between entrepreneurs since rms can now substitute entrepreneurslabor with
land when wages are relatively too high. With this modelling the author shows
that the dispersion-agglomeration conguration of the CP is enriched by a dis-
persion of activities when trade liberalization is high enough26 .
26Moreover, unlike the CP and FE, agglomeration (and de-agglomeration) appears gradu-
ally.
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4.1.2 Other transaction costs
In the FE model, one basic assumption is to consider that homogeneous agricul-
tural goods is trade costless. It is thus important to know if this simplication is
central to the conclusion of the CP. We already know from Davis (1998), which
is based on Helpman and Krugman (1985) that if the two sectors bear identical
transaction costs then the home market e¤ect disappears. By making the same
extension on the CP model, Fujita Krugman and Venables (1999) show that the
dispersive equilibrium can be stable for all levels of industrial trade costs. As
Figure 6.a illustrates there is in fact an overlap of industrial transaction costs
between which agglomeration and dispersion are stable, but unlike the initial
model there is no break point.
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Figure 6 The tomahawk diagrams
Another interesting extension made by these authors is to integrate a special-
ization of each country in the production of homogeneous goods, thus they
introduce the Armington (1969) assumption into this sector. This introduction
gives less categorical results, as Figure 6.b shows the introduction of agricul-
tural transaction costs generates a scenario in three steps, for high industrial
trade costs dispersion dominates, for intermediate costs, agglomeration occurs
and vanishes for low industrial transaction costs.
4.2 Land rent and commuting costs
« One cannot get rid of land as a factor of production and of rent
as a determining element of cost and exchange value » Samuelson
((1957), p2)
The introduction of land rent and commuting costs has been operated mainly
by Krugman and Livas (1996), Tabuchi (1998), Helpman (1998), and Murata
and Thisse (2005). On the one hand, Tabuchi (1998) added commuting costs
and land rent to the seminal model of the NEG and then build a tale between
the Core-Periphery of Krugman (1991.a) and the monocentric city of Alonso
(1964). On the other hand, Helpman (1998) drops the agricultural sector and
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introduces an exogenous housing stock while in Livas and Krugman (1996) the
dispersive force of immobile farmers is replaced by entrepreneurscostly need
to commute. In the last model, the authors analyze trade relation between two
cities, and between both of them and the rest of the world. Murata and Thisse
(2005) simplify this setting by removing the rest of the world. Here, we propose
to survey the last analysis. There are two monocentric cities in this model,
the North and the South, and only one sector, the Increasing Returns to Scale
activity (IRS). Entrepreneurs work in this IRS sector and are mobile between
cities, those agents who own one land unit are spread along a line, and because
their business is located in the middle of this line (called the Central Business
District (CBD)) they need to commute. These commuting costs have a direct
impact on their labour force. As each of them owns one labour unit, the total
amount supplied by an entrepreneur who lives on the fringe of the CBD (i.e. at
location x, the CBD being at location 0 by convention) is:
s(x) = 1  2 j x j (32)
where  (with  < 1) is the commuting cost level. j x j measures distance from
CBD. Furthermore, as the number of entrepreneurs is h, entrepreneursmaximal
distance from the CBD is h2 , thus the total labour supply net commuting costs
in one city is equal to:
S =
h=2Z
 h=2
s(x)dx = h(1  h=2) (33)
In comparison with the CP, replacing S by h(1  h=2) has modied the force
at work, the home market e¤ect given by (16) is now equal to:bhbY = 1ZZ   ( Z2Z + 1  Z ) bwbY (34)
where Z =
1 =2
1 =4 is an inverse measure of commuting costs; there is no commut-
ing cost when Z = 1 and very high commuting costs when Z = 23 (Z 2 [ 23 ; 1]).
Thus by considering once again that entrepreneurslabour supply is perfectly
elastic, bw = 0, we get: bhbY = 1ZZ (35)
Hence one percent change in the northern demand for manufactures, bY , in-
creases entrepreneursemployment, bh, by 1ZZ (> 1) percent in the North. The
novelty is that here, this home market e¤ect is reduced by commuting costs.
Moreover the income earned by entrepreneurs is di¤erent to the CP since entre-
preneurs earn a land rent and pay commuting costs. As the land rent on both
edges of the segment is normalized to zero, with wh the entrepreneurswage
near the CBD, then their wage net of commuting costs earned at both edges is:
s(h=2)wh = s( h=2)wh = (1  h)wh (36)
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Because consumers are identical in terms of preferences and income, at equi-
librium they must reach the same utility level. Thus entrepreneurs who live in
the fringe of the segment only receive a net wage of (1   h)wh, but pay no
land rent. On the contrary, workers who live near the CBD do not pay high
commuting costs, but the price of the services yielded by land is higher in this
location. Thus, the increase in real wage near central places o¤sets the land
rent. A move from the suburb to the CBD implies a decrease in commuting
and therefore an increase in the net wage, but also an equivalent increase in
the land rent which equalizes utility among individuals. In other words, the
following condition must be veried:
s(x)wh  R(x) = (1  h)wh
where s(x) is the total amount supplied by a worker who lives on the fringe of
the CBD, R(x) is the land rent prevailing at x, while the RHS (right-hand side)
represents the wage net of commuting costs earned on both edges given by (36).
By inserting expression (32) in this system we nd the following land rent:
R(x) = (h  2 j x j)wh with x 2 ( h=2; h=2)
Thanks to that, we can nd the Aggregate Land Rent (ALR):
ARL =
h=2Z
 h=2
R(x)dx = h2wh
While on the one hand, Tabuchi (1998) assumes that there are absentee land-
lords, and on the other, Helpman (1998) assumes that the aggregate land rent
is owned at global level, here Murata and Thisse (2005) (but also Livas and
Krugman (1996)) assume that each entrepreneur owns an equal share of the
ALR where they reside. Thus their non salaried income is:
ALR=h = hwh=2 (37)
In comparison with the CP the income of each individual now incorporates the
land rent and commuting costs:
Y = h(1  
2
h)wh
where 1  2h comes from the income of land ownership (37) and from the wage
net of commuting costs ((1  h)wh).
From this we can verify that a positive variation of h increases Y , indeed we
know by log di¤erentiating this equation of income that:bY = Zbh+ bw
then one percent change in entrepreneursemployment in the North, bY , increases
the northern demand by 1Z percent (with bw = 0). Thus the larger manufactur-
ing sector has a more than proportionally larger home market, moreover from
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the HME equation (35) we know that the larger home market has a more than
proportionally larger manufacturing sector, this is the demand-linked circular
causality already emphasized previously. However here this backward linkage
decreases with commuting costs.
The last di¤erence with the CP model concerns the migration equation which
becomes equal to:

 =
wh
wh
1  h=2
1  h=2(
P 
P
)
hence the novelty comes from the term (1  h=2) which enters multiplicatively
in the indirect utility, and creates a dispersive force independently of transaction
costs which is the land market crowding e¤ect.
In comparison with the CP, the conclusion of the model is reversed, ag-
glomeration appears when trade costs are high, but when trade is liberalized,
entrepreneurs prefer to be dispersed since this spatial conguration allows them
to alleviate the burden of commuting costs. Considering this model, Candau
(2006) shows that whatever the value of trade costs the dispersive equilibrium
Pareto dominates the agglomerative one.
4.3 Tastes heterogeneity
Murata (2003) and Tabuchi and Thisse (2002), enrich the conclusion of the
NEG by introducing taste heterogeneity in the choice of location. This taste
heterogeneity is central since the common assumption that all individuals share
the same preferences is highly implausible, as the authors point out that some
mobile people have a strong attachment to their regions, not only for mone-
tary reasons but also for non market attributes (local or social amenities: the
climate, the culture, the family etc...), thus such heterogeneity can weaken ag-
glomeration forces. More precisely, by using a probabilistic migration dynamics
borrowed from the discrete choice theory, the authors show that from the disper-
sion of activities a gradual and partial agglomeration appears before a gradual
re-dispersion. Another interesting result suggested by this model is that non-
market interests can be higher when individuals reach a certain level of real
income, which indicates that peoples mobility may decrease with the develop-
ment level.
4.4 Firms heterogeneity
Until now we have only analyzed entrepreneursmobility, however, in many
cases entrepreneurs are not mobile, they simply invest in another country and
the reward of their capital is repatriated. Martin and Rogers (1995) are the
rst to analyze such a situation. Their model, where entrepreneursmobility is
replaced by capital mobility is called the Footloose Capital (FC for short). The
FC is very close to the FE, only two di¤erences emerge: entrepreneurs do not
own labour but capital thus in all the equations presented for the FE model in
the rst section the label wh needs to be replaced by  which is the reward to
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capital, and capital mobility is ruled by the following equation:

 =


where price indices have disappeared since entrepreneurs consume where they
reside and not where they invest. Unlike the FE, the fact that the capital is
repatriated cuts out demand-linked circularity since the shift in production can-
not lead to a shift in expenditure, and also rules out cost-linked circularity since
the cost of living e¤ect does not impact on the equation of capital mobility. In
terms of conclusion, the FC model does not verify either Proposition 1 (depart-
ing from dispersion trade liberalization never generates any agglomeration of
the population) or Proposition 2 (there are no multiple locally stable equilibria
except for free trade where each location dened by S 2 [0; 1] is a stable equi-
librium). However, by assuming that countries are asymmetric in size, Baldwin
(1999) shows that agglomeration appears gradually with respect to . This is
illustrated by Figure 7 where the dashed line represents the result of this asym-
metric FC model. In such a case, the agglomeration rent (
 > 1) also exists
after P .
Figure 7 The tomahawk diagram
However things are di¤erent if we integrate the heterogeneity of rms. Such a
work initiated by Melitz (2003)27 has been used in the FC model by Baldwin
and Okubo (2005). Heterogeneity is introduced via the marginal production
costs, now each rm produces a variety with a specic labour input coe¢ cient,
denoted i for a typical rm i. The innovation technology that permits to obtain
a particular i is stochastic in the sense that this marginal cost is distributed
to a rm randomly. More precisely the distribution of i is assumed to be a
Pareto probability distribution. Unlike the classical Dixit-Stiglitz model, selling
27 see also Bernard et al. (2003), Helpman et al. (2004), Melitz and Ottaviano (2003),
Yeaple (2005)
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a new variety requires rms to pay xed costs to enter local and export markets.
These beachheadcosts can be advertising costs, rules of origins (see Demidova
et al. (2005)), etc. As a result of such a modelling, three kinds of rms are
distinguished: the X-type which prots low marginal costs ranked between 0 and
X and which pays a beachhead cost F ; this type of rm sells on both the local
and foreigner markets. The D-type which produces under intermediate marginal
costs ranked between X and D, and also pays a beachhead cost F , this type
of rms is not competitive enough to sell abroad and then they restrict their
objective to the domestic market. Lastly the N-type has to produce a variety
with high marginal costs ranked between D and 0; these marginal costs are
even too high to sell varieties on the local market. These beachhead costs which
are sunk require rms to take into account their future operating prots, the
authors assume that the discount rate is equal to zero and that the rmdeath
process follows a Poisson law. With this setting, Baldwin and Okubo consider
two polar cases, the case where delocation is very slow and free/entry is fast,
which is a simplied version of the Melitz model, and the case where delocation
is high and free/entry slow, which is a modied version of the FC model with
heterogeneity and beachhead costs. Here we are going to focus on the last case.
Authors assume that the North is initially bigger than the South and show that
when trade gets freer, the most southern e¢ cient rms rst move gradually
toward the North, then after a certain level of trade liberalization, denoted P ,
all the X-type rms have moved, and the move of D-type rms begins, if the
market entry cost is low enough then a total agglomeration in the North can
happen, conversely with a high entry cost only a partial agglomeration occurs.
The diagram 7 illustrates these ndings.
5 Public Policy
5.1 Individual welfare
Up to now we have only analyzed entrepreneursrelative welfare in order to know
where they want to reside. Charlot et al. (2006) proposed a deeper analysis by
studying the individual welfare of the four interest groups (S entrepreneurs in
the North, S in the South, L workers in the North and L in the South) which
are given by:
VS(h; ) = whP
 ; V S (h; ) = w

hP
 
VL(h; ) = P
 ; V L (h; ) = P
 
since these authors work with the FE model, P and P  are given by (9) with
m = 1; " =  = 1 and thus equal to:
P = (S + S)1=(1 ), P  = (S + S)1=(1 )
and w, w are found by resolving the market clearing condition (13) withm = 1;
" =  = 1; f = 1 which yields:
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wh =
bL((S + S) + (S + S)+ bS(2   1)
 (S + S)(S + S) + b(S(S + S) + S(S + S)) + b2SS(2   1)
wh =
bL((S + S) + (S + S)+ bS(2   1)
 (S + S)(S + S) + b(S(S + S) + S(S + S)) + b2SS(2   1)
with b =


The objective is to analyze these expressions under the opposite equilibria of
agglomeration and dispersion, and then to compare these equilibria in order to
determine which one is the better social outcome.
When all entrepreneurs are located in the North S = 1 S = 1, the welfare
of this group is given by28 :
VS(1; ) =
2bL
1  b (38)
According to this expression entrepreneurs do not care about transaction costs
and this is easily understood as they have nothing to import. Immobile workers
in the North share the same indi¤erence concerning transaction costs, while
in the South these costs have a real importance, their decrease, is welfare-
enhancing:
VL(1; ) = 1; V

L (1; ) = 
a (39)
with a = =(   1) (40)
Under dispersion entrepreneursand workerswelfare is given by:
VS(
1
2
; ) = V S (
1
2
; ) =
2bL((1 + )=2)a
1  b (41)
VL(
1
2
; ) = V L (
1
2
; ) = (
1 + 
2
)a (42)
An entrepreneur prefers agglomeration to dispersion when VS(1; ) > VS( 12 ; );
then by using (38) and (41) we can verify that happens if  < 1, which means
that:
Proposition 3 Whatever the level of transport costs, entrepreneurs prefer ag-
glomeration to dispersion.
However this proposition appears specic to the FE or CP models. Indeed
on the one hand Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2006) show that entrepreneurs
mobility between regions is essential to that conclusion: actually by using their
FEVL where entrepreneurs are intersectorially mobile but cannot move between
28This expression (and some others) di¤ers from Charlot et al. (2005) since authors make
di¤erent normalizations:  = 1=; S =  under agglomeration, S = =2 under dispersion and
L = L = 1   (see their lemma 2).
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nations, they show that this proposition is found in the Core, but not in the
Periphery where trade costs need to be su¢ ciently low in order to verify this
result. On the other hand Candau (2006) demonstrates that this proposition
depends largely on the dispersive force used, indeed by using the Murata and
Thisse (2005) model where the dispersive force of immobile workers is replaced
by commuting costs, this author shows that whatever the level of transport
costs, entrepreneurs prefer dispersion to agglomeration.
Concerning workers, those in the North prefer agglomeration to dispersion
on condition that VL(1; ) > VL( 12 ; ). By using equation (39) and equation (42)
such a result is obtained when  < 1. Southern workers prefer agglomeration to
dispersion on condition that V L (1; ) > V

L (
1
2 ; ). By using equation (39) and
equation (42) such a result is obtained when  > 1, which is impossible. This
implies that whatever the value of trade costs, peripheral workers always prefer
dispersion.
This provides the following proposition in the FE:
Proposition 4 Regional conict of interests: whatever the value of trade costs,
inhabitants of the agglomeration (entrepreneurs and workers) prefer agglomer-
ation while peripheral workers prefer the dispersive equilibrium. Then no agree-
ment is possible for trade liberalization which is a non Pareto improving policy.
Since the unanimous preference either for agglomeration or for dispersion is
impossible, the authors propose to follow Kaldor (1939), Hicks (1940) and Sci-
tovsky (1941) in their costs-benet analysis. For Kaldor a situation A (Agglom-
eration) is preferred to a situation D (Dispersion), if the gainers (entrepreneurs)
of the reform that lead from D to A (trade liberalization) can compensate for
the losers of this reform (workers). Ex-ante the Hicks criterion considers that
a situation A (Agglomeration) is better than a situation D (Dispersion), if the
losers of the change (D ! A) cannot bring the gainers to give up this reform.
As a result, the Kaldor criterion concludes that the agglomerative equilibrium
is socially desirable only when trade costs are su¢ ciently low, while according
to the Hicks criterion agglomeration is always desirable. This means that the
former criterion considers dispersion as the best outcome when trade costs are
high while the latter argues the reverse. According to the Scitovsky criterion a
situation A is better than a situation D only if the two previous criteria agree
with that proposition, then here we are typically in a situation of indetermina-
tion. Concerning the FEVL, Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud are confronted with
the same indetermination problem. Then the cost benet analysis does not shed
much light on the new economic geography model. In order to remedy to the
problem, Charlot et al. turns to Rawls and Bentham. In particular they use
the Social Welfare Function proposed by Atkinson (1970), which allows one to
distinguish between the Utilitarist and the Rawlsian point of view:
W =
1
1  

L(VL)
1  + L(V L )
1  + S(VS)1  + S(V S )
1 
where  is the aversion toward inequality: with  = 0 the government is utili-
tarist and maximizes the sum of individual indirect utilities while with  = +1
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it is Rawlsian, and then maximizes the utility of the worst o¤. Authors nd
that the utilitarist government always prefers agglomeration when varieties are
su¢ ciently di¤erentiated, however when these varieties are good substitute dis-
persion becomes the better equilibrium under a critical value of trade liberaliza-
tion. Since this critical value is lower than the critical value obtained by Kaldor,
a utilitarian government is going to sustain the agglomeration well-founded for
a wider range of  than the government advised by Kaldor. Accordingly the au-
thors consider that the utilitarian behavior is biased regarding agglomeration.
Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud nd the same result when vertical linkage and
trade costs are low in the FEVL. Furthermore in the two models the Rawlsian
government is always in favour of dispersion. In other words, the evaluation of
the market outcome depends hugely on societal value. Lastly Fujita and Thisse
(2002) show that this proposition of regional conict interests can disappear if
the growth gained from agglomeration is signicant enough, however if the boost
given by agglomeration is too weak then the same remark concerning societal
value holds.
5.2 Tax competition
5.2.1 Theoretical consideration
The Basic Tax Competition model (BTCM) emphasizes that a race to the bot-
tom in tax rates can occur when capital mobility increases. However, the New
Economic Geography literature has put this result into perspective: beside the
mobility of factors, the mobility of goods also matters. In a world of increasing
returns, and in order to be close to demand and to minimize transaction costs,
rms have strong incentives to be agglomerated in central places. Such agglom-
eration generates a rent for the mobile factors which allows the government that
hosts this agglomeration to increase its taxes without capital ight. By using
the FE model when h = 1 this rent is given by the following expression:

(1; ) =
21 a
1 + 2   b(1  2)
To see how this expression varies with transactions, a log di¤erentiation of it
gives:
d
=

d=
= (1  a)  
2(1 + b)
1  (1  2)(1 + b)=2
this expression is increasing until max =
p
b and decreasing later. This is
summarized by the following result:
Proposition 5 The agglomeration rent is bell-shaped with respect to trade lib-
eralization.
This agglomeration rent, which is linked to trade liberalization in a non
monotonic way, has generated a ourishing literature concerning the tryptic
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trade integration / imperfect competition / agglomeration (Andersson and Forslid
(2003), Baldwin and Krugman (2004), Kind et al. (2000), Ludema and Wooton
(2000), Ottaviano and Van Ypersele (2002)). Indeed because this rent succes-
sively increases and decreases with the freeness of trade, a race to the top can
be followed by a race to the bottom. These conclusions seem to be veried by
stylized facts. ln order to have a global view of the evolution of this tax com-
petition on a European scale, we follow Baldwin and Krugman by dividing the
EU into two parts: the core that hosts a major part of agglomeration and the
periphery. But unlike the authors we do not consider only a geographical de-
nition of the core, but rather an economic denition: a country is dened as a
part of the core when at least one of its regions (level NUTS2) has a market po-
tential per capita higher than 8000 euros per inhabitant per km. Thanks to this
denition based on Combes and Overman (2004)s map 3, the Core is dened
by: Benelux, France, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Switzerland,
and the Periphery by: Austria, Finland, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Norway, Portu-
gal, Spain, Sweden. According to this clustering, Figure 8 displays how the tax
gap between the Core and the Periphery measured by the Statutory Tax Rate
(STR), the E¤ective Average Tax Rate (EATR) and the E¤ective Marginal Tax
Rate (EATR) follows a bell-shape over the period 1986-200329 .
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Figure 2.8 Tax Gap (based on Devereux et al. (2002))
ln order to take into account the di¤erence of size between the Core and the
Periphery, Baldwin and Krugman (2004) analyze the tax policies between gov-
ernments in case of total agglomeration of activities in the North, so they hence-
29The STR is the most basic measure of corporate income taxes, here local taxes are in-
tegrated to the calculation. The EMTR measures the e¤ect of taxation on the incentive of
a rm to make an marginal investment, while the EATR measures the e¤ect of taxation on
the installation of a new rm (see Devereux et al. (2002), Box 1 p 461 for the detail of
calculations)
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forth limit themselves to  > b. Preferences are given by:
U =MA1 G
where G is the supply of local public goods. With Andersson and Forslid (2003)
it is assumed that public goods are produced via the private goods. Thus the
composition of demand and all the variables that we have analyzed so far (wages
and prices) are not a¤ected by tax. We assume that each jurisdiction supplies
the same amount of public goods but the nancing of these goods f and f can
di¤er from one jurisdiction to the next (implicitly each governments e¢ ciency
can vary30):
f = tY; f = tY 
Because the supply of public goods is the same everywhere, migration stops
when post-tax reward is higher in the Core. The location equilibrium condition
is thus given by:
V
V 
=
1  t
1  t  1
We furthermore assume that governments maximize the following objective
function:
W =W (f; t); Wf > 0
As has been pointed out by Baldwin and Krugman (2004), denoted BK for
short, the common point between the Leviathan and a benevolent government
is that their objective functions rise with the collected revenue and decline with
the tax rate, however because the tax rate also has an impact on the revenue,
a shift in it rst has a positive e¤ect on the objective and then a negative one.
Thus, the objective function needs to be a bell-shaped curve when the tax rate
increases.
The local governments play a Stackelberg game, the sequence of this game
is the following: i) The North sets a tax rate t ii)The South reacts through a
tax rate t iii) Migration occurs.
This game is resolved by backward induction. The third stage is already
known by the previous analysis of the model. The second stage is summarized
by Figure 9. The vertical axis represents the objective function of the South,
while the horizontal axis plots the level of taxation in this country.
There are two possible situations: if the South does not succeed in stealing
the Core, then its revenue is small because it can tax only immobile workers
(thus equal to tLwa), on the contrary, if this country succeeds in attracting
all the activities, then its revenue is going to be much higher (t(wh + L
wa)).
Total agglomeration in the North depends therefore on the potential taxation
levied by the South. The Northern government can indeed be upset by a tax
tb , which enables the South to break the Core equilibrium:
tb = 1  
(1; )(1  t) (43)
30Another explanation of these equations and of the no delocation condition has been
proposed by Baldwin and Krugman (2004) who assume that supply of public goods can di¤er
from one jurisdiction to the next but that entrepreneurs do not take this di¤erence into account
when they decide to move.
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This break-point tax rate rises with t and falls with 
(1; ).
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Figure 9 The tax game
Thus, if we start from a situation where the Core/North sets a high tax rate,
say t
00
, then the break-point tax rate, denoted t
00
b on the diagram is also high,
and thus the South can steal the Core by setting t equal to t
00
b . If the North
decides to choose a lower tax level, say t
0
, then in such a case the South can
steal the Core by lowering t to t
0
b . However in such a case t
0
b is equivalent
to the tax rate that maximizes the objective function of the South without the
Core, namely tu, thus the South is indi¤erent between the Core or the Periphery.
Therefore, in the rst stage, if the North wants to keep the Core, it needs to
set a tax below or equal to t
0
, such that the South does not want to deviate
from tu. This limit tax rate, denoted te, is thus equal to t
0
on the diagram and
analytically found by:
te = 1  1  t

b

(1; )
(44)
where tb s:t W
[tuY
(0; ); tu] = W
[tuY
(1; ); tu] W e
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We now need to verify that the North always prefers to have the Core. This is
ensured by the fact that the North winsWe with the Core and nothing without,
accordingly the North will always "limit tax" the South. By using a specic
objective function, W (f; t) = G   t2=2; and by applying the above described
game, the authors determine the di¤erential te   tu which represents the level
of tax competition:
te   tu = 1  L 
(1 +
p
b)  (1 pb)L
(1 +
p
b)
(1; )
(45)
This gives the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Trade liberalization leads to an increase in the tax gap between
the Core and the Peripheral regions at rst and next to a race to the bottom in
terms of taxation.
Proof. Indeed we get:
@(te   tu)
@
= C
@
(1; )
@
with C =
(1 +
p
b)  (1 pb)L
(1 +
p
b)
(1; )2
> 0
and we know from proposition 5 that @
(1;)@ is at rst positive and next negative
when  increases.
5.2.2 Empirical verication
The previous proposition is a strong result which goes against the conclusion
of the basic tax competition model, and which can disappear in a model à la
Krugman and Livas (1996) since in this model the agglomeration rent is strictly
decreasing in . A formal proof of this can be found in Candau (2006). Then
the need to test this proposition empirically is necessary. Such a work has been
undertaken by Gilbert et al. (2005), who propose to test the following equations:
tt   tt = 1t + 22t + F + t (46)
tt   tt = 1t + 22t + 3(Yt   Y t ) + F + ijt (47)
tt   tt = 1t(Yt   Y t ) + 22t (Yt   Y t ) + F + ijt (48)
tt   tt = 1t + 22t + 3(Yt   Y t ) + 4t(Yt   Y t ) + 52t (Yt   Y t ) + F + ijt
where tt   tt and Yt   Y t represent respectively the tax gap and the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) gap between two countries at the period t. This
estimation is based over the period 1982-2001 and tested on the EU15 and
EU25. For the EU15 the authors use successively the statutory tax rate, the
ex-post tax rate, the e¤ective average tax rate and the e¤ective marginal tax
rate, while only the former two are available for the EU25. F combines xed
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e¤ects associated with countries and time : F =  +  + t. For all these
estimations, the following constraint is set:
Yt > Y

t
This constraint allows one to distinguish between the Core and the Periphery.
Then in the rst equation the authors simply test if the tax gap is bell-shaped
with respect to . In the second one they include the GDP gap in order to
understand if this gap plays an independent role on  in the shape of the tax gap.
In the third equation, the authors want to test if the GDP gap and  interact
on the evolution of the tax gap. Lastly the fourth equation tests simultaneously
all the assumptions presented above. Concerning the measure of , the authors
adopt the method developed by Head and Mayer (2004), which is the following:
from the demand equation they nd that the total value of import from i to j,
and from i to i, is respectively given by:
cij = n
 Y
P 1 
p1 ; cii = n
Y
P 1 
p1  (49)
then by dividing cij by cii they get:
cij
cii
=
np1 
np1 
(50)
idem for cji = 
n Y

P1  p
1  and for cjj = n Y

P1  p
1 , then by multiply-
ing the previous equation (50) by cji=cjj one nds:r
cji
cjj
cij
cii
=  (51)
The interest of this method is that cji; cji are bilateral trade data which are
easily available, and cii and cjj are approximated by the national production
minus the total exportation of the country. The results of equation (46) and
(47) reveal that the tax gap measured by the e¤ective average tax rate and the
e¤ective marginal tax rate follows a bellshape with respect to  for the EU15.
Concerning statutory tax rate and ex-post rate, the relationship is less robust
for the EU15 and EU25. However equation (48), which takes into account
interaction between the tax gap and the GDP gap is signicant for the two
samples. This means that the bell-shaped tax gap tends to be atter when
the di¤erence between countries is small, or in other words, the more countries
sizes di¤ers, the higher the bell-shaped tax gap with respect to  This result
is interesting and deserves perhaps to be studied on a theoretical angle. Indeed
Baldwin and Krugman (2004) only consider the case of total agglomeration in
one country and thus implicitly they study the evolution of the tax gap between
countries that are diametrically di¤erent, then we can imagine that if these
countries were less di¤erent then the bellshape would be less pronounced. But
actually this is not the case: indeed the sole model that analyzes tax competition
under partial agglomeration, i.e. the Borck and Püger (2006) model, nds that
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the tax gap strictly increases when trade is liberalized. Moreover, we wished that
the empirical study of Gilbert et al. were based on aggregate data, indeed the
choice of taxes by governments is certainly made by considering the most mobile
rms, and then a denition of  at industry level (as in Head and Ries (2001),
Head and Mayer (2004) etc) would improve the analysis. Besides, Gilbert et
al. use their estimation results in order to calculate the level of integration that
allows one to obtain the maximal tax gap between two countries. They nd
that in 2000 the new members of the EU25 were far from this maximum level
of  beyond which a race to the bottom is predicted.
5.3 Some extensions and propositions
5.3.1 Tax competition
In this section, we propose two extensions of the literature on tax competition.
The Baldwin and Krugman (2004) model analyze the e¤ect of identical and
reciprocal trade liberalization on tax competition, however in Europe, the en-
largement starts with preferential and non reciprocal trade liberalization. For
instance, after the collapse of communism, the CEECs were integrated into the
General System of Preference, and soon afterwards they signed the European
Association Agreements and more recently the Free Trade Agreements. Then
we are going to show that such liberalization changes the issue, only a race to the
bottom appears. Secondly, the EU fosters economic integration by liberalizing
trade between countries, but also by investing in internal infrastructure inside of
peripheral regions, what can be the e¤ect of such a policy on tax competition?
Unilateral trade policy Instead of analyzing reciprocal trade, we consider
what happens when market access to the Core is given by , while market access
to the South is given by , with such trade costs, price indices are now given
by:
P 1  = h+ h; (P )1  = h+ h (52)
and nominal wages by:
wh = b(
Y
h+ h
+ 
Y 
h+ h
), wh = b(
Y
h+ h
+
Y 
h+ h
)(53)
with b =


(54)
In such a case the agglomeration rent is given by:

 =
21 a
1 +  + b(   1) (55)
This expression permits to a¢ rm that when the Core liberalizes its market to
the Periphery then the agglomeration rent decreases. Indeed by di¤erentiating

 with respect to  we obtain:
@

@
=   2(1 + b)
2 a
(1 +  + b(   1))2 < 0 (56)
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Concerning tax competition, the tax gap is still given by equation (45) (but
with 
 given by (55)). For convenience we report this expression below:
te   tu = 1  L 
(1 +
p
b)  (1 pb)L
(1 +
p
b)

This gives the following result:
Proposition 7 Non reciprocal trade liberalization of the Core leads countries
to launch a race to the bottom.
Proof. Indeed we get:
@(te   tu)
@
= C
@

@
with C =
(1 +
p
b)  (1 pb)L
(1 +
p
b)
2
> 0
and we know from (56) that @
(1;;
)
@ < 0 thus
@(te tu)
@ < 0
Improvement of internal infrastructure in the Periphery We are going
to consider that trade between regions is reciprocal and given by  as in Baldwin
and Krugman, but that trade inside nations implies internal costs I in the
North and I in the South. Thanks to this, price indices are given by:
P 1  = Ih+ h
; (P )1  = h+ Ih

and nominal wages by:
wh = b(I
Y
Ih+ h
 + 
Y 
h+ Ih
), wh = b(
Y
Ih+ h
 + 

I
Y 
h+ Ih
)
In such a case, the agglomeration rent is the following:

 =
21+aI 
1 a
(1 + b)2   (b  1)II
(57)
From this expression we are able to show that when a supranational policy
improves the internal infrastructure of the Periphery, then the agglomeration
rent decreases. Indeed by di¤erentiating 
 with respect to I we obtain:
@

@I
=
2(b  1)2+aI 1 a
((1 + b)2   (b  1)II)2
< 0 (58)
which is negative since b =  < 1.
Concerning tax competition, the tax gap is still given by equation (45) but
with 
 given by (57), and this yields the following result.
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Proposition 8 A supra national policy that improves the internal infrastruc-
ture of the Periphery leads countries to launch a race to the bottom.
Proof. We have:
@(te   tu)
@I
= C
@

@I
with C =
(1 +
p
b)  (1 pb)L
(1 +
p
b)
2
> 0
and we know from the (58) that @
(1;;
)
@I
< 0 thus @(te t

u)
@I
< 0
Irelands past policy in terms of taxation, can perhaps be understood in this
way.
5.3.2 Regional infrastructure and Growth
Until now we have spoken about governmentsaim to attract as many activities
as possible. The reason for such a policy is often based on the goal of promoting
national growth. Surprisingly, the FE model with endogenous growth built
by Fujita and Thisse (2002) has never been used in order to illustrate how
policies can a¤ect the growth rate. Here we want to focus on two policies:
internal trade cost improvement in the Periphery and improvement of knowledge
spillovers. In the previous analysis we have presented the static FE model with
internal trade costs in the case of agglomeration in the North. However we
have not considered what happens when trade costs are relatively high. The
top of Figure 10.a, where the horizontal axis plots the number of entrepreneurs
in the North while the horizontal axis displays their relative welfare illustrates
this. We can see that when trade between nations are relatively high ( = 0:6)
and internal trade in the South is utterly integrated (I = 1) any deviations
from the dispersive equilibrium generate a decrease in welfare and thus render
the situation in which entrepreneurs are equally spread between nations stable.
However internal trade costs are often non null, as the simulations illustrate, the
higher entrepreneurs are in the South, the more they tend to be agglomerated
in the North. For instance at I = 0:97, 80% of the entrepreneurspopulation
are located in the North. Furthermore when we described the Fujita and Thisse
model, we remarked that the growth rate follows a U-shape with respect to the
number of entrepreneurs with a minimum at S = 1=2 (see the bottom of Figure
10). This implies that a decrease in southern internal costs leads to a decrease
in rate growth31 .
31Parameters:  = 5;  = 0:4; L = L = 1=2;  = 1; I = 1
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Figure 2.10 Public policies
Moreover we have noticed that an increase in  which represents the nature
of spillovers (local spillovers when  = 0; global spillovers when  = 1) raises
the growth rate g(S) in a way described by the top of Figure 10.b. Since now
spillovers are not only localized in the North but common to both nations, some
relocations occur, then such a policy as fosters the di¤usion speed of human
capital is benecial to territorial equity and growth. In brief we can write the
following result: Public policies that aim to improve internal infrastructure in
the Periphery are detrimental to growth while policies that succeed in di¤using
the technological knowledge of the North to the Periphery foster global growth.
Of course, these results can to be veried in formally by using the Fujita and
Thisse model in more detail, but Martin (1998, 1999) has already proved such
a proposition by using the Footloose Capital model.
6 Concluding remarks
The two propositions that were initially put forward by the theoretical aspect
of the NEG have been questioned by empirical works which seem to correct the
idea that agglomeration occurs when trade liberalization tends to free trade and
are also sceptical as to the hypothesis of multiple equilibria. These investigations
and criticisms have marked a new starting point for theoretical works which now
integrate land rent, commuting costs, endogenous growth and have investigated
the public policies that the NEG may recommend. We have thus reached a
point where empirical works need to test these recommendations.
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